For the first time in the sphere of international criminal law, and unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters or the Statutes of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals, Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides a general definition for the mental element required to trigger the criminal responsibility of individuals for serious violations of international humanitarian law. The first paragraph of Article 30 stresses that unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the ratione materiae of the International Criminal Court Ôonly if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledgeÕ. The second paragraph identifies the exact meaning of intent, whereas the third paragraph defines the meaning of knowledge.
At first sight, it appears that the explicit words of Article 30 are sufficient to put an end to a long lasting debate regarding the mens rea enigma which has confronted the jurisprudence of the two ad hoc Tribunals for the last decade, but this is not true. Scholars disagree regarding the exact meaning of intent under Article 30. Some view Article 30 as encompassing the three categories of dolus, namely, dolus directus of the first and second degree and dolus eventualis. Others hold the opinion that the plain meaning of Article 30 is confined to dolus directus of the first degree (intent in stricto sensu) and dolus directus of the second degree (indirect or oblique intent).
At present, the only guidance given by the International Criminal Court (ICC) regarding the meaning of Ôintent and knowledgeÕ as set out in Article 30 is the decision rendered by Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC I) of 29 January 2007 in the Lubanga case.
1 There, the PTC I asserted that the cumulative reference to ÔintentÕ and ÔknowledgeÕ as provided for in Article 30 requires the existence of a volitional element on the part of the accused, and that volitional element encompasses three degrees of dolus, namely, dolus directus of the first and second degrees and dolus eventualis.
This paper examines in depth the elements of culpability as set out in Article 30 from a comparative criminal law perspective as well as the relationship between Article 30 and other provisions of the ICC Statute in light of the Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges.
2 The comparative study undertaken in this paper is significant since the codification of Article 30 -as with other provisions under the Statute -was conducted by several codifiers who brought their own legal cultural experience to the drafting of this provision.
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The paper concludes with some suggestions regarding the mens rea standards which are deemed appropriate to trigger the criminal responsibility of individuals for serious violations of international humanitarian law.
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Elements Analysis -Mental Elements and their Objects
In order to hold a person criminally responsible and liable for a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC, it must be established that the 1 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803, De´cision sur la confirmation des charges, (Lubanga De´cision sur la confirmation des charges), 29 January 2007.
2 Ibid.
